![]() The plaintiff in fact then signed a declaration on 8 July 1994, so confirming that he was ready that the disputed child be indicated as the son of the defendants X and Y. The Court noted how A had instituted separation proceedings against his wife X in 1994 whereby he held that although he had three children from his marriage to X, he held that X had claimed that the youngest child was not his. ![]() The Court noted that this was an action known as the ‘actio de in rem verso’, an action regulated by law and instituted in cases of enrichment, to the detriment of third parties, without just cause, which action may only be exercised where the person who suffers the loss may not take another action to make up for such loss. (v) The defendant was not enriched without just cause. (iv) A was always aware that the child was not his own and therefore, such maintenance should be deemed as a gratuitous donation leaving no grounds for this action to be instituted. (iii) without prejudice to the above, A’s requests were unfounded both in terms of fact and on the basis of law since the law expressly provides that there shall not be a reimbursement of maintenance and therefore, in view of such prohibition, there cannot be an action on the basis of unjustified enrichment ![]() (i) A’s claim was prescribed in terms of Article 2156(f) of the Civil Code (Chapter 16 – Laws of Malta) (iii) Condemn the defendants or either of them to pay the plaintiff the amount so liquidated. (ii) Liquidate the sum representing such enrichment without just cause (i) Declare that the defendants or either of them had indeed been enriched without just cause to his prejudice On this basis, the plaintiff A therefore requested the Court to: A therefore claimed that the defendants had been enriched without just cause to his detriment. By virtue of a judgement delivered by the First Hall Civil Court in 2002 it was in fact declared that the child was the natural and biological child of the defendant Y and not A’s. In June 1989, the child, Z was born and from his date of birth until the date of separation, A maintained the child as his own. The facts of the case were essentially as follows:Ī and X were legally separated by virtue of a contract of personal separation in 1994. During the course of proceedings, the defendant Y passed away and was substituted by X acting as curator for her minor son as heir of the deceased defendant Y. The plaintiff A sued the defendants X and Y, the child’s mother and the child’s biological father respectively. The paper strives to explain and reveal the mystery of this action from a different point of view, especially with respect to commerical law (ius commercium), following the scholarly knowledge of modern Italian school of Roman law.This case concerned a claim for the reimbursement of maintenance supplied by the plaintiff A with respect to a child Z who he eventually found out was not his biological son. to the amount of the peculium, can be seen as a typical form of the modern limited liability company. The fact that a slave was conducting business activity on behalf of his dominus (whom he was representing) and entering into contracts with third persons, but the dominus was liable for such obligations only to a certain extent, i. From the functional point of view, an important analogy can be drawn between actio de peculio and modern corporate law. ![]() These actions were implemented into the Roman "law order" by the praetors edict activity, namely, from the chronological point of view, between the 2nd century B.C. The conference paper deals with actio de peculio, or more precisely actio de peculio et de in rem verso, which falls under the group of adjective actions (the so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis). Actio de peculio liability limited liability company
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